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ALD-294

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-2262
___________
JOSEPH ARUANNO,
Appellant
v.
JENNIFER VELEZ;
JOHN/JANE DOES 1-25, et al.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00152)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 27, 2012
Before: SLOVITER, FISHER AND WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed October 5, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________

PER CURIAM.
Pro se Appellant Joseph Aruanno appeals from the order of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his civil rights action for failure
to state a claim. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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The District Court’s opinion presents a detailed summary of the background of
this action, so we will not repeat it at length. Aruanno is confined at the Special
Treatment Unit (STU) in Avenel, New Jersey. He filed a civil rights complaint against
Jennifer Velez, Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Human Services, and
twenty-five John/Jane Does. He asserted that the Defendants have denied him an STU
job in retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights “to remain silent under the 1st,
5th, 14th, but not limited to, in light of my innocence of a crime I did not commit and
pending appeals.” (Complaint, Statement of Claims.) Aruanno also alleged that he is
being denied personal hygiene items, clothing, legal document preparation materials,
medical care, therapeutic care, and adequate food and nutrition, as a result of the
retaliation. (Id.) He also alleged that Defendant Velez “promulgated unconstitutional
policy which denies me a job.” (Id., ¶4 Parties.) As relief, he sought damages and
injunctive relief of being given a job. Aruanno also filed an application to proceed in
forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
The District Court granted Aruanno’s in forma pauperis application and screened
the complaint for dismissal under section 1915(e)(2)(B). The District Court analyzed
Aruanno’s complaint under the doctrine of claim preclusion. The District Court noted
that Aruanno previously was unsuccessful in asserting retaliation claims against STU
defendants for exercising his rights under the First and Fifth Amendments. The District
Court noted that in Aruanno v. Spagnuolo, D.N.J. Civ. No. 07-cv-2056, Aruanno asserted
that the defendants withheld privileges, such as a job, in retaliation for his refusal to
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reveal his sexually violent past behavior during treatment sessions for convicted sex
offenders; Aruanno maintained that he was being compelled to confess to crimes that he
did not commit, in violation of his First and Fifth Amendment rights. That complaint
was dismissed, and we affirmed, holding that Aruanno’s claim cannot succeed because of
his failure to demonstrate that the deprivation of a job constituted “compulsion” to speak
that triggered First and Fifth Amendment protections. See Aruanno v. Spagnuolo, C.A.
No. 07-4276, slip op. at 4-5 (3d Cir. Jul. 15, 2008) (citing McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24
(2002)). The District Court also noted that the same allegations had been raised and
dismissed under the doctrine of claim preclusion in Aruanno v. Sweeney, D.N.J. Civ.
No.08-cv-4449, and affirmed in C.A. No.09-2789 (consolidated with Salerno v. Corzine,
C.A. No. 07-3357, and Traylor v. Main, C.A. No. 08-1019). Thus, the District Court
ordered the dismissal of Aruanno’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
This appeal followed. The parties were advised that the appeal would be
submitted for possible summary action. Aruanno has filed a response in support of his
appeal.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal under section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may affirm
the District Court on any ground supported by the record. See OSS Nokalva, Inc. v.
European Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 761 (3d Cir. 2010).
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Aruanno argues that the District Court erred because the doctrine of claim
preclusion does not apply here, asserting that his previous case “was never honestly
adjudicated” and that he alleged new consequences of being denied “basics” after being
denied a job. Appellant’s Summary Action Response at 2. Aruanno acknowledges that
he filed a similar action that was consolidated on appeal in Salerno, in which we affirmed
the dismissal of Aruanno’s complaint on the basis of the outcome of his prior action in
Aruanno v. Spagnuolo. However, he emphasizes that the other appellants in Salerno
succeeded in having their cases remanded to the District Court, and he argues that we
should similarly remand his current appeal for consolidation with the pending Salerno
matter.
We need not reach the question of whether claim preclusion applies here, because
the allegations in his complaint fail to state a claim. As in his prior action in Aruanno v.
Spagnuolo, Aruanno asserted retaliation by STU defendants, in the form of the denial of a
job, for exercising his constitutional rights to remain silent regarding a crime that he
maintains that he did not commit. As we found in that case, denial of a job for failure to
admit to the crime for which he is confined does not amount to a “compulsion” to speak
under the First and Fifth Amendment protections. Because the conduct leading to the
alleged retaliation is not within the scope of constitutional protections, Aruanno cannot
prevail on his retaliation complaint. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir.
2001) (“prisoner-plaintiff in a retaliation case must prove that the conduct which led to
the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected”). As for Aruanno’s contention that
4

his case should be remanded for consolidation with the Salerno case, there is no basis for
granting that relief.1
We conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing Aruanno’s complaint
for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, because this appeal presents no substantial
question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See Third Circuit
LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.

1

In Salerno, we held that the District Court erred in applying qualified immunity to bar
the other plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief. We remanded the matter for
consideration of the claims on the merits in the first instance. See Salerno v. Corzine, et
al., C.A. Nos. 07-3357, 08-1019, and 09-2789 (consolidated), slip op. at 7-8 and n.7 (3d
Cir. Oct. 26, 2011). The situation is not analogous here, where the District Court’s
dismissal relies in part on the fact that Aruanno already has received an adjudication on
the merits of his retaliation claim.
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